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How Do Case Law and Statute Differ? 
Lessons from the Evolution  
of Mortgage Law
Andra Ghent    Arizona State University
Abstract
This paper traces the history of mortgage law in the United States. I explore the 
history of foreclosure procedures, redemption periods, restrictions on deficiency 
judgments, and foreclosure moratoria. The historical record shows that the most 
enduring aspects of mortgage law stem from case law rather than statute. In 
particular, the ability of creditors to foreclose nonjudicially is determined very 
early in states’ histories, usually before the Civil War, and usually in case law. 
In contrast, the aspects of mortgage law developed through statute change more 
frequently. This finding calls into question whether common law is inherently 
more flexible than the civil-law system used in some other countries. However, 
case law tends to be less responsive to populist pressures than statutes. My find-
ings suggest that the reason common law favors financial development is un-
likely to be its greater flexibility relative to law made by statute.
1. Introduction
Common-law countries provide creditors and equity investors with more pro-
tection and better enforcement of contracts than civil-law countries (on creditor 
rights, see, for example, La Porta et al. [1998]; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 
[2007]; Djankov et al. [2008]; on other types of financial contracts, see, for ex-
ample, Lerner and Schoar [2005] and La Porta et al. [1998]). As a consequence 
of such greater protection and enforcement, common-law countries have bet-
ter developed financial systems such that businesses find it easier to raise capi-
tal in them. However, it is unclear exactly what feature of common law leads to 
these benefits. It has been widely argued that the common-law system, with its 
I am grateful to the Research Institute for Housing America (RIHA) for funding. Some portions 
of this paper were disseminated as an RIHA research paper. Earlier versions of this paper circulated 
under different titles. I thank an anonymous referee, Charles Calomiris, Giovanni Favara, Michael 
Fratantoni, Mark Palim, Sam Peltzman, Paul Rhode, Ken Snowden, Justin Wiseman, and partici-
pants at the Mortgage Bankers Association 99th annual meeting and the 2013 National Bureau of 
Economic Research Summer Institute for helpful comments. Loan Marsanico and Sujith Puram pro-
vided research assistance.
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strong reliance on case law, is inherently quite flexible and, in particular, adapts 
more quickly to changes in economic conditions than does civil law, which re-
lies on code (see, for example, Priest 1977; Rubin 1977; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Levine 2003; Levine 2005; Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007; La Porta, Lopez-de- 
Silanes, and Shleifer 2008; Ponzetto and Fernandez 2008). In his summary of the 
literature, Levine (2005, p. 64) asserts that “a defining trait of British common law 
is that judges regularly interpret and shape the law as new circumstances arise.” 
Similarly, in their review, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008, p. 305) 
conclude that “the central strategy of judicial law making is distinguishing cases 
from precedents, which has an unintended benefit that the law responds to a 
changing environment.”
The analysis of the history of U.S. mortgage laws that I document in this paper 
instead reveals the remarkable inflexibility of laws developed in case law. I exam-
ine the early case law and document when states enacted the various statutes that 
now govern real estate security instruments (mortgages and deeds of trusts). I 
explore what led states to adopt a nonjudicial foreclosure procedure as the com-
mon procedure the lender uses to foreclose, what led to differences in the time 
period the borrower has to redeem the property either before or after foreclosure 
(redemption periods), and what led some states to restrict the lender’s recourse to 
only the property (rather than the property as well as the borrower’s other assets 
and income) in the event of default.
What I find is that the aspects of mortgage law that developed mainly through 
case law show remarkable persistence. Arguably, the most important creditor 
right in mortgage law is the ability to foreclose without seeking a judge’s ap-
proval. In most states, whether a lender can foreclose without a judge’s approval 
is determined in case law, and the case law is established early in states’ history, 
typically before the Civil War. Once there is precedent, the rules regarding the 
procedure the lender must follow rarely change substantially. Once there is a 
body of case law, changing the procedure the lender must use to foreclose re-
quires the legislature to change the civil code of procedures. Changing the civil 
code of procedures is akin to the way law is made in civil-law countries. Rather 
than adapt quickly to economic conditions, case law can be extremely inflexible, 
as the history of mortgage laws reveals. In contrast, aspects of mortgage law that 
are determined by statute, such as how long the borrower has to get the property 
back after a foreclosure sale, change much more over time.
These more frequent statutory interventions almost always aim to benefit debt-
ors at the expense of creditors. Legal scholars have long understood that legis-
latures tend to interfere with private debt contracts in such a populist fashion. 
As Thurgood Marshall argued in 1827 (Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 334–35 
[1827]), the interventions of state legislatures denigrate creditors’ rights and 
threaten the advancement of commerce:
The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor, of interfering with 
contracts, a power which comes home to every man, touches the interest of all, and con-
trols the conduct of every individual in those things which he supposes to proper for his 
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own exclusive management, had been used to such an excess by the State legislatures, as 
to break in upon the ordinary intercourse of society, and destroy all confidence between 
man and man. The mischief had become so great, so alarming, as not only to  impair 
commercial intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the 
people, and destroy the sanctity of private faith.
In the history of U.S. mortgage laws, I find no early examples in which state 
legislatures interfered with private contracts to benefit creditors at the expense 
of debtors; the only interventions in which state legislatures enacted a statute to 
enhance creditor rights are a handful of deed-of-trust statutes in the latter half 
of the 20th century and early 21st century. In contrast, three sets of evidence are 
consistent with legislatures passing statutes abrogating creditors’ rights in re-
sponse to populist pressure.
First, in the few instances in which I find that foreclosure switched from being 
a nonjudicial process to a process requiring judicial approval, the change usu-
ally happened through statute rather than judicial rulings. Second, in the 1930s, 
many state legislatures passed antideficiency statutes, which restricted the right 
of creditors to pursue a borrower in default personally such that the creditor’s 
only recourse became the mortgaged property. Consistent with such laws being 
a result of populist pressure, I find that farm foreclosure rates and the share of 
out-of-state credit predict whether a legislature passed such a statute. State judi-
ciaries often struck down these statutes, however. In all such instances in which 
an antideficiency statute was meant to apply retroactively, judges intervened to 
preserve the integrity of private contracts. In at least one instance, a judge went 
further and prevented the law from applying to future mortgages. Finally, as has 
been established by Alston (1983, 1984), the foreclosure moratoria of the 1930s 
were acts of legislatures responding to widespread farm mortgage distress. Sim-
ilar to their reaction to antideficiency statutes, judges deemed many of the fore-
closure moratoria unconstitutional. In essence, in the history of mortgage law, 
the judiciary serves to restrain the populist impulses of state legislatures.
The history of U.S. mortgage law is not the only evidence that aspects of case 
law make the common-law system inflexible. In their study of private limited- 
liability companies (PLLCs), Guinnane et al. (2008) find that the United States 
was extremely slow to adopt PLLCs because of precedents in case law forbidding 
them. The comparison of the contracting environments in 19th-century America 
and France by Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005) also challenges the notion that 
the common-law legal system is inherently more flexible than legal systems based 
on a civil code. Malmendier (2009) finds that law in the early Roman Repub-
lic, often seen as the precursor to the civil-law system (see La Porta, Lopez-de- 
Silanes, and Shleifer 2008), adapted frequently to business needs.
Given the extremely early date at which I find that foreclosure procedures were 
established, it is safe to treat differences in some state mortgage laws, at least at 
present, as exogenous, which may provide economists with a useful instrument 
for studying the effect of differences in creditor rights (see, for example, Pence 
2006; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2011). Furthermore, the extent to which a credi-
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tor’s right to nonjudicial foreclosure is determined in case law, and the relative 
lack of case law’s response to populist pressures, suggests that it is uncorrelated 
with economic fundamentals more than a century later. More generally, the dis-
tinction I find between the effects of economic circumstances on statutes relative 
to their influence on case law suggests that differences in state laws that arose 
through case law are more plausibly exogenous than differences in state laws that 
arose through statute.
Section 2 of this paper describes the nature of mortgage contracts and fore-
closure processes in the United States, defines some basic terminology, and pro-
vides a summary of how creditor friendly the mortgage laws are in each state 
at present. Section 3 shows that the creditor’s right to power-of-sale foreclosure 
emerged largely in case law and rarely changes over time. It also documents that 
statutory redemption rights, which are exclusively determined in statute, change 
much more frequently. Section 4 discusses the reaction of legislatures to popu-
list pressures in the 1930s and judges’ responses to the legislation. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2. Mortgage Laws in America Today
The laws across U.S. states differ in the legal theory underlying the mortgage 
contract and in how they balance the rights of creditors with those of borrowers. 
Despite at least five distinct attempts over the years to create a uniform mortgage 
code, mortgages today continue to be governed by a very diverse set of state laws.1 
Table 1 summarizes the dimensions of mortgage laws along which states differ 
and the extent to which an aspect of mortgage law is pro-creditor.
The first difference across states is in the legal theory underpinning the mort-
gage. What is commonly termed a mortgage consists of two legal documents. The 
specific terms under which the borrower must repay the loan are contained in 
the promissory note. The borrower is known in legal terms as the mortgagor, and 
the creditor is referred to as the mortgagee. In a title-theory state, the mortgage 
provides the mortgagee ownership of the property until the borrower has paid off 
the debt. If a state follows title theory, the lender retains title to the property until 
such time as the borrower pays off the mortgage. Under lien theory, the mort-
gage merely provides the lender with a lien on the property; the borrower owns 
the property during the duration of the mortgage, and the lender’s interest in the 
property is limited to situations in which the borrower defaults on the mortgage. 
Table A1 and Figure A1 document that older states tend to follow title theory, 
and younger states usually follow lien theory. While the distinction between title 
1 Durfee and Doddridge (1925) and Pomeroy (1926) discuss at length the provisions of a uniform 
mortgage act. This act does not ever seem to have been passed. Reeve (1938) argues for the need 
for a uniform real estate mortgage act. That act too does not seem to have become law. Schwartz 
(1972) notes the proposed Uniform Land Transactions Act, which was never adopted. Bernhardt 
(1992) discusses the provisions of the Uniform Land Security Interest Act of 1985, which has yet to 
be  adopted by any state. Nelson and Whitman (2004) analyze the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure 
Act of 2002 and argue for its adoption at the federal level.
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and lien theory no longer has any substantial effect on the balance of power be-
tween borrower and creditor, different legal theories nevertheless require differ-
ent mortgage documents, which adds to the paperwork burden of national lend-
ers.2
States also differ in whether the standard real estate security instrument is a 
mortgage or a deed of trust, although the term “mortgage” refers to both instru-
ments in everyday usage. In most states, the standard way to finance a property 
is with a mortgage. However, in some states the standard instrument is a deed of 
trust wherein the legal title to the property is entrusted to a third party known 
as the trustee. Unlike a mortgage, for which there are only two parties, there are 
three parties in a deed-of-trust transaction. In a deed-of-trust state, the trustee 
sells the property if the borrower defaults. In states that follow the lien theory of 
mortgages, the equitable title nevertheless remains with the borrower. The main 
reason some states use a deed of trust rather than a mortgage is because, as I dis-
cuss in greater detail below, when lenders began including power-of-sale clauses 
in mortgages, some judges viewed it as improper for the lender to be able to sell 
the property.
When a borrower becomes delinquent on her mortgage, there are two main 
factors that affect the speed with which the lender can take possession of the 
property. First, some states require the lender to go to court and receive a judge’s 
approval to foreclose (judicial foreclosure). In other states, the lender may sell 
the property if the mortgage contains a power-of-sale clause, or, if a deed of trust 
is the standard real estate finance instrument, the trustee is obliged to sell the 
2 The existence of title theory is a product of the evolution of mortgage laws in England. In medi-
eval England, in the most common form of mortgage, the lender received the rents and profits from 
the land to satisfy the debt. This prevented the contract from being seen as one in which the bor-
rower was paying interest per se to the lender, which thus ensured that the contract was not usurious 
(Glaeser and Scheinkman 1998). Until the early 16th century, all lending at interest was forbidden, 
although occasional exceptions were made for money lending by Jews to gentiles (Temin and Voth 
2008). As a result, it was crucial that the mortgage contract be structured in such a way that the con-
tract did not violate usury laws. The mortgage contract evolved into a conditional conveyance (Jones 
1878) in the sense of the property conveying to the borrower only on satisfaction of the debt rather 
than merely serving as collateral in the event the borrower failed to make timely interest and prin-
cipal payments. This structure further differentiated the contract from an interest-bearing loan. The 
advantage of title theory in medieval England was thus that the payment of rents and profits on land 
to which the lender had title prevented the lender from being in violation of usury laws.
Table 1
Creditor or Debtor Friendliness of U.S. Mortgage Law
Aspect Creditor or Debtor Friendly
Lien theory rather than title theory  Neither
Deed of trust rather than mortgage  Neither
Power-of-sale foreclosure usual procedure  Creditor
Longer statutory redemption periods  Debtor
Longer equitable redemption periods  Debtor
Deficiency judgments permitted without substantial restrictions  Creditor
Scire facias rather than standard judicial procedure  Creditor
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property on the lender’s behalf. States that permit power-of-sale foreclosure are 
often known as nonjudicial foreclosure states, although there technically are non-
judicial foreclosure procedures other than power-of-sale foreclosure.3 Even in 
 power-of-sale states, however, the lender usually can pursue judicial foreclosure 
if it chooses. Given the higher transaction costs and time to foreclose associated 
with judicial foreclosure, however, lenders usually foreclose nonjudicially if state 
law permits it without any additional burdens relative to judicial foreclosure. 
Lenders in a power-of-sale state might choose to use judicial foreclosure if there 
is a problem with the title to the property. Some states also require the lender to 
pursue judicial foreclosure if it wants to obtain a deficiency judgment, as I dis-
cuss later in this section. Finally, some states that technically permit power-of-
sale foreclosure give the borrower greater redemption rights under power-of-sale 
foreclosure or impose other burdens on lenders if they foreclose by power of sale 
such that they more commonly choose judicial foreclosure.
The second main factor that affects the speed with which a lender can foreclose 
is redemption rights. A redemption right is the right of the borrower to redeem 
the property by paying off the entire balance of the mortgage. A redemption pe-
riod is a period during which the borrower has redemption rights. If the redemp-
tion period precedes the foreclosure sale, the right of the borrower to redeem 
during that time is known as an equitable redemption right. Such a right might 
take the form of requiring the lender to wait, say, 6 months after the first serious 
delinquency before it can foreclose. In practice, most states have some equitable 
redemption period that arises because of long notification and advertisement re-
quirements, although some might not necessarily term these waiting times equi-
table redemption periods. Many states also allow the borrower some time period 
after the foreclosure sale to redeem the property. The borrower’s right to redeem 
the property for some specified number of months after the foreclosure sale is 
known as a statutory redemption right. Because statutory redemption rights 
cloud the title of the property for prospective buyers at the foreclosure auction, 
they are arguably more problematic for lenders than are equitable redemption 
rights.
Finally, some states have laws that restrict the rights of lenders to pursue a res-
idential borrower personally to recover the debt owed to the lender. For example, 
suppose a borrower defaults on a mortgage of $300,000, and the fair market value 
of the property is only $200,000. The borrower still owes the lender $100,000 after 
the lender seizes the property. To recover the $100,000, the lender in most states 
can obtain a deficiency judgment, which will enable it to seize any other assets 
the borrower has and garnish the borrower’s wages. In some states, the lender 
automatically receives a deficiency judgment if the value of the property is not 
adequate to cover the debt owed, but in most states the lender must file a lawsuit 
3 Some other states permit nonjudicial foreclosure through a method known as foreclosure by 
advertisement. However, at present, this foreclosure method is usually seen to be even more cum-
bersome for lenders than judicial foreclosure and is thus rarely used by lenders; see, for example, 
Barry (1980).
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to obtain a deficiency judgment. A mortgage in which the lender can get a defi-
ciency judgment is generally known as a recourse mortgage. If there is no specific 
clause in the promissory note that establishes a nonrecourse mortgage, a clause 
known as an exculpatory clause, the mortgage is a recourse mortgage unless state 
statute overrides it. Exculpatory clauses are not generally used in U.S. residential 
mortgages, although they are common in commercial mortgages. States that have 
sweeping antideficiency statutes that effectively make mortgages nonrecourse are 
known as nonrecourse states.
Table 2 illustrates the diversity across states in mortgage laws and provides a 
crude index of the extent to which a state’s laws are pro-creditor; Figure 1 pres-
ents the information geographically. I score states on a 4-point system. I award 
2 points for the foreclosure procedure usually used. I award states permitting 
power-of-sale foreclosure with minimal restrictions 2 points. I award 1 point to 
the two states that offer a creditor-friendly form of judicial foreclosure known as 
scire facias, Delaware and Pennsylvania. Section 3 explains why Delaware and 
Pennsylvania developed this unusual form of judicial foreclosure. It differs from 
other forms of judicial foreclosure in that the onus is on the borrower to provide 
a reason why the lender should not be able to foreclose. The figures Russell and 
Bridewell (1938) present on the cost and time it took in the 1930s to foreclose 
in Delaware and Pennsylvania support the idea that this is an expedient if not 
a cheap procedure. States in which judicial foreclosure is the norm receive no 
points for the foreclosure procedure. The source for the data is the USFN (2008).
The primacy of power-of-sale foreclosure in the scoring system reflects its 
prominence in the most recent foreclosure crisis and the literature surrounding 
it. A sudden increase in the number of foreclosures, such as that observed during 
the financial crisis of 2007–9, can overwhelm a judicial system and lead to sub-
stantial delays in the lender’s ability to recover its collateral. Using data from the 
recent foreclosure crisis, Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2011) find that the availablity 
of judicial foreclosure decreases the number of foreclosures. There are economic 
consequences of this availability even if, as Gerardi, Lambie-Hanson, and Willen 
(2013) argue, judicial foreclosure only delays, instead of prevents, foreclosures. 
Because of the debt-overhang problem (see Melzer 2012), a delay in foreclosing 
implies that the property will be in worse condition by the time the lender re-
covers its collateral. Perhaps because of these reasons, Calomiris, Longhofer, and 
Miles (2013) document differences in home price dynamics between judicial and 
nonjudicial states.
One point is awarded if the state permits deficiency judgments without sub-
stantial restrictions. I allocate only 1 point for this aspect of foreclosure laws, as 
recourse provisions affect primarily higher-income borrowers. Although Ghent 
and Kudlyak (2011) show that state laws that restrict deficiency judgments in-
crease the risk of foreclosure, they find that it matters only for home values of 
$200,000 or more. They also find that recourse affects the lender’s ability to get 
the borrower to agree to a deed in lieu of foreclosure or a short sale. With the 
exception of Nevada, the state classification here follows the scheme of Ghent 
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Table 2
Creditor-Friendliness Score of U.S. States’ Current Mortgage Laws
State by Region Score State by Region Score
Pacific: East South Central:
 Alaska 2  Alabama 3
 California 3  Kentucky 2
 Hawaii 2  Mississippi 4
 Oregon 3  Tennessee 4
 Washington 2   Regional average 3.3
  Regional average 2.4 Middle Atlantic:
Mountain:  New Jersey 2
 Arizona 3  New York 2
 Colorado 3  Pennsylvania 3
 Idaho 4   Regional average 2.3
 Montana 3 South Atlantic:
 Nevada 3  Delaware 3
 New Mexico 4  District of Columbia 4
 Utah 4  Florida 2
 Wyoming 4  Georgia 4
  Regional average 3.5  Maryland 4
West North Central:  North Carolina 3.5
 Iowa 0  South Carolina 2
 Kansas 2  Virginia 4
 Minnesota 2  West Virginia 4
 Missouri 3   Regional average 3.4
 Nebraska 4 New England:
 North Dakota 1  Connecticut 2
 South Dakota 1  Maine 2
  Regional average 1.9  Massachusetts 4
West South Central:  New Hampshire 4
 Arkansas 4  Rhode Island 4
 Louisiana 2  Vermont 1
 Oklahoma 1   Regional average 2.8
 Texas 4
  Regional average 2.8
East North Central:
 Illinois 2
 Indiana 2
 Michigan 3
 Ohio 2
 Wisconsin 0
  Regional average 1.8
Note. States are classified according to laws in place for residential mortgages originated in 2010 or later. 
Scores are awarded as follows: 4 = most creditor-friendly laws, 0 = least creditor-friendly laws; power-of-sale 
foreclosure is the usual procedure = 2, deficiency judgments are permitted without substantial restrictions 
= 1, statutory redemptionis usually less than 6 months = 1. Although Delaware and Pennsylvania require 
judicial foreclosure, their scire facias is unusually creditor friendly and so is awarded 1 point rather than 
0; North Carolina permits deficiency judgments on refinanced mortgages but forbids them on purchase 
mortgages and so is awarded .5 point, as it permits deficiency judgments on refinanced mortgages but 
forbids them on purchase mortgages.
This content downloaded from 149.169.223.65 on Sun, 8 Mar 2015 19:39:34 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1093
Fi
gu
re
 1
. 
Cr
ed
ito
r-
fri
en
dl
in
es
s s
co
re
s o
f c
ur
re
nt
 U
.S
. m
or
tg
ag
e l
aw
s
This content downloaded from 149.169.223.65 on Sun, 8 Mar 2015 19:39:34 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1094 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS
and Kudlyak (2011). Nevada changed to a nonrecourse state after the end of their 
sample period (see Li and Oswald 2014). I award North Carolina .5 point rather 
than no points, as it permits deficiency judgments on mortgages used to refinance 
an existing mortgage on a property but bans them on mortgages used to purchase 
a property. Finally, I award 1 point if the state has no statutory redemption pe-
riod or a redemption period of less than 6 months. The data source for statutory 
redemption rights is USFN (2008).
Figure 1 and Table 2 reveal substantial heterogeneity within census regions 
in the degree to which mortgage laws are creditor friendly. Although mid-
western (West North Central and East North Central) states have the least 
 creditor-friendly laws, even within these regions there is substantial heterogene-
ity. The heterogeneity across geographically similar states is due to what La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008, p. 286) refer to as the “well-known judicial 
arbitrariness in common law countries.” As Section 4 demonstrates, the validity 
of power-of-sale foreclosure, which makes up half of the creditor rights score, is 
largely decided in case law and is thus subject to the preferences of an individual 
judge. Similarly, while various legislatures attempted to pass antideficiency stat-
utes, individual judges decided differently as to the constitutionality of such stat-
utes despite circumstances appearing quite similar in different states.
3. Foreclosure Procedures
3.1. Historical Background
For the first mortgages in America, foreclosure was an exclusively judicial pro-
cess, and in all of the 13 original colonies that had chancery courts (also known 
as equity courts), only what is now known as strict foreclosure was available.4 
Because strict foreclosure does not involve a sale of the property, there was no 
concept of a statutory redemption period in colonial America. Strict foreclosure 
involved the lender going to an equity court and asking it to terminate the bor-
rower’s equity of redemption; foreclosure by sale of the property was not permit-
ted, and any equity the borrower had in the property would be lost in the foreclo-
sure. The equity-of-redemption principle, an invention of English equity courts5 
in the late 17th century, meant that, despite not having made payment on the 
date stipulated in the mortgage, the borrower could regain his property by paying 
all principal, interest, and fees due on the debt at some time after the expiration of 
4 Pennsylvania, which lacked chancery courts and included the state of Delaware in colonial times, 
developed the writ of scire facias as a rapid foreclosure alternative (Skilton 1943).
5 Courts of equity (also known as courts of chancery, or simply chanceries) existed to prevent the 
strict letter of the law from being enacted too harshly on subjects. In effect, the legal concept of eq-
uity is the idea that there is a set of principles that might not be explicit in rules of law but that most 
human beings agree to as a matter of basic ethics or natural law. Chancellors used discretion in these 
courts far more than in courts of law. In contrast to courts of law, courts of chancery admitted ver-
bal (parol) evidence regarding the conditions under which parties agreed to the mortgage contract. 
Although the concept of equity of redemption was not formally recognized in English courts of law, 
Chaplin (1890) cites evidence from as early as the 12th and 13th centuries that courts of law exer-
cised some equitable interpretation of mortgages.
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the contract. Early in the history of the equity of redemption, there seems to have 
been no limitation on the time frame during which the borrower could redeem 
his property (Jones 1878). Eventually, the lender could petition a court of equity 
to set a date by which the borrower had to repay the principle, interest, and fees. 
If the borrower had not completed payment by that date, he would forever lose 
his right to redeem the property, and the conveyance to the lender would become 
unconditional (Williams 1866). Such an end was known as foreclosure before the 
modern usage of foreclosure by sale.
As a result of difficulties in obtaining a strict foreclosure, at some point in the 
18th century British lenders began asking the courts to agree to a sale in lieu of 
foreclosure. A sale in lieu of foreclosure ensured that the borrower would receive 
any value of the property in excess of that required to pay off the debt such that 
the borrower did not forfeit his estate altogether. In the absence of well- developed 
land and financial markets with small parcel sizes, many borrowers would have 
had positive equity, and a sale in lieu of foreclosure would have been fairer to the 
borrower. The success of sales in lieu of foreclosure eventually led to the insertion 
of power-of-sale clauses into many mortgages to further encourage chancellors to 
grant a sale in lieu of redemption.
With the exception of Connecticut, which still requires strict foreclosure, Am-
erican states rapidly embraced the concept of a foreclosure sale rather than strict 
foreclosure. As foreclosure by sale grew in popularity, many states permitted the 
borrower a statutory right of redemption wherein the borrower could regain pos-
session of the property after a foreclosure sale by repaying the principal, interest, 
and fees.
3.2. Power-of-Sale Foreclosure
Early on, a foreclosure sale still necessitated the approval of a judiciary. Gradu-
ally, however, courts came to respect power-of-sale clauses inserted in mortgages 
or trust deeds in many states. A landmark U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Newman 
vs. Jackson (25 U.S. 570 [1827]) favored power-of-sale clauses in regulating a dis-
pute in the Georgetown area of Washington, D.C., and set a precedent for other 
states. Despite this precedent, it took decades for many states to rule that power-
of-sale foreclosure was valid or to begin using power-of-sale clauses. However, 
by 1863 lenders were able to foreclose by a nonjudicial foreclosure procedure in 
many states (J.F.D. 1863). Table 3 summarizes the use of power-of-sale foreclo-
sure in selected years.
The similarities between the laws in the different periods are striking. Of the 
37 states for which I have data from 1863, only nine states (Oregon, Arkansas, 
Oklahoma, Illinois, New York, Georgia, South Carolina, Maine, and New Hamp-
shire) changed their stance on power-of-sale clauses substantially between 1863 
and 2008. As I discuss below, early Wisconsin case law makes me question the 
assertion in J.F.D. (1863) that power-of-sale foreclosure was “usual” in 1863 and 
that only eight states truly changed their foreclosure laws. The median number of 
changes is 0, and the mean is less than .5.
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Figure 2 maps the states that had adopted power of sale or deeds of trust by 
1863. There is no obvious geographical pattern. There is also no significant cor-
relation between either the state’s age or whether the state follows the title theory 
of mortgages or the lien theory of mortgages and whether it allows nonjudicial 
foreclosure as of 1863. The absence of any clear geographical pattern or basis in 
the theory of the mortgage makes it necessary to carefully examine the case law 
and relevant statutes to better understand the divergence in legal development.
As Drummy (1976, p. 90) eloquently states, “the power of sale is considered a 
right of contractual agreement rather than one of legislative invention” such that, 
in most cases, the validity of power-of-sale foreclosure and deeds of trust is de-
termined in case law rather than by statute. Consequently, often the decision of a 
single judge often ends up determining the process. For example, despite the na-
tional Supreme Court precedent in 1827, Justice Loyal C. Kellogg of the Supreme 
Court of Vermont declared that a power-of-sale clause was not generally valid in 
Wing v. Cooper (37 Vt. 169, 183–84 [1864]). Kellogg’s reasoning was as follows:
A power of sale given by a mortgage deed is not an ordinary power, and as between the 
mortgagor and mortgagee, it should be strictly construed. In this state, it is in practice 
unusual if not unknown. We have no statute regulating its exercise, and a sale under it 
might be made without the concurrence of the mortgagor, and even without notice to 
him. It is too important a power to rest upon implication and local reasoning, and ought 
not, as we think, to be recognized in any case unless it is conveyed by an express grant and 
in clear and explicit terms.
While this ruling did not exactly forbid power-of-sale clauses, which would have 
been inconsistent with the national precedent, the interpretation of the ruling 
banned them for all practical purposes. Without the legislature intervening to 
regulate the exercise of power-of-sale foreclosure, the ruling seems to make it im-
possible to enforce a power-of-sale clause.
Table 4 summarizes the early case law and statutes that exerted such a per-
manent influence on the practicability of power-of-sale foreclosure. Examina-
tion of the cases reveals that, with rare exceptions, judges upheld the validity of 
power-of-sale clauses inserted in mortgages. In only six states (Vermont, Florida, 
Wisconsin, Louisiana, Utah, and Nebraska) did judges rule in such a way as to 
make the exercise of power-of-sale clauses impossible or impractical. In the case 
of Iowa, judges went further in essentially overturning a statutory ban; the legis-
lature enacted a new ban on power-of-sale foreclosure shortly thereafter.
Furthermore, once the validity of power-of-sale foreclosure is decided in case 
law, the case law governing its use does not substantively change unless there is 
a statutory intervention. To the extent that the laws on power-of-sale foreclosure 
change at all, they do so because of statute. Legislatures usually act to abrogate the 
ability of parties to enter into contractual agreements with power-of-sale clauses 
rather than to preserve the rights of creditors. For example, the legislature of Or-
egon intervened in 1862 to require mortgages to be foreclosed in a court of law. 
Similar statutes were passed in Arizona (1913), Idaho (1898), New Mexico (1929), 
Iowa (1858 and 1873), Kansas (1859), North Dakota (1933), Illinois (1862), Indi-
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ana (1879), Kentucky (1820), and South Carolina (1932). The Maine legislature 
only made it impractical by passing a statute with a 12-month redemption period 
in 1871. Other statutory interventions merely prescribed particular procedures 
required for the use of power-of-sale clauses.
Prior to World War II, the only case in which a legislature intervened to credi-
tors’ advantage was the 1774 New York statute, but even that statute might not be 
truly a statutory intervention to benefit creditors. Rather, there was some initial 
doubt regarding the validity of power-of-sale foreclosure in New York. The 1774 
statute merely clarified the matter. Furthermore, New York state courts had long 
and clearly upheld the rights of creditors with power-of-sale clauses (see, for ex-
ample, Jackson v. Turner, 7 Wend. 458 [1831]; Lawrence v. Farmers’ L&T. Co., 13 
N.Y. 200 [1855]; Elliott v. Wood, 45 N.Y. 71 [1871]). The reason that New York 
now uses judicial foreclosure is that the legislature instituted increasingly oner-
ous statutes that creditors had to follow to exercise a power-of-sale clause (Jones 
1879, pp. 604–8).
The instances in which the legislature intervenes to make power-of-sale fore-
closure illegal or impractical reveal of the responsiveness of legislators to debtors 
rather than creditors. In an unusually early statute, Kentucky banned power-of-
sale foreclosure in 1820. As Thorp (1926) discusses, 1819–21 was marked by re-
cord low commodity prices, financial panic, and a collapse in real estate values. 
As a rapidly expanding western state at that time, it is likely that Kentucky was 
heavily reliant on out-of-state credit, and the legislature may have been respond-
ing to populist demands from farmers for relief. Data from the U.S. census reveal 
that Kentucky’s population grew by almost 40 percent between 1810 and 1820. 
Kentucky was very agrarian and heavily dependent on slave labor; U.S. census 
records from 1820 indicate that more than one-fifth of Kentucky’s population 
consisted of slaves. Substantial capital would have been required to purchase the 
slaves, which made Kentucky reliant on out-of-state capital. In a time of distress, 
and without settled case law on the matter, the legislature favored domestic bor-
rowers over out-of-state creditors.
The states that passed statutes making power-of-sale foreclosure difficult to en-
force in the second half of the 19th century are Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
and Kansas. Although these states passed anti-power-of-sale statutes at different 
points during the last half of the 19th century, all of these states were heavily de-
pendent on out-of-state credit, and fear of foreclosure featured prominently in 
agrarian unrest (see Stock 1984). Legislatures responded to such foreclosure fears 
by reducing the risk of foreclosure for their constituents at the expense of credi-
tors from out of state. The reason legislatures could intervene in these cases is that 
the states were young enough that there was no well-established case law uphold-
ing power-of-sale clauses.
Several state legislatures intervened during the Great Depression. At the be-
ginning of the Great Depression, the legislature of New Mexico intervened to 
make power-of-sale foreclosure illegal. North Dakota banned nonjudicial fore-
closure in 1933 (Vogel 1984) as part of wide-ranging farm foreclosure relief. As 
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Alston (1983) points out, North Dakota had an unusually high farm foreclosure 
rate during the Great Depression, which suggests that its ban on foreclosure was 
also a populist measure. The South Carolina legislature passed a statute effectively 
banning power-of-sale foreclosure in 1932. The West Virginia legislature at-
tempted to make power-of-sale foreclosure illegal in 1933, but the courts deemed 
the act unconstitutional (Poteat 1938).
Early Wisconsin case law foreshadows the issues that creditors would en-
counter with nonjudicial foreclosure. The decisions in Byron v. May (2 Wis. 
443 [1850]) and Walton v. Cody (1 Wis. 420 [1853]) are clear that power-of-sale 
clauses do not obviate the jurisdiction of chancery courts to decide the correct 
way to dispose of a property. Indeed, the judge in Walton v. Cody seems to sug-
gest that the equity of redemption resides with the mortgagor and “will expire by 
the limitations which the [mortgagor] himself has prescribed” (1 Wis. 434). Since 
the debtor remained in possession of the property during the 24-month equitable 
redemption period, nonjudicial foreclosure was impractical. The claim by J.F.D. 
(1863) that nonjudicial foreclosure was “usual” is also not supported by evidence 
suggesting that Wisconsin may never have truly been a power-of-sale foreclosure 
state. As a result, the change in Wisconsin is not a sudden reversal.
Even when economic circumstances changed to make power-of-sale foreclo-
sure convenient, the shift away from judicial foreclosure could not be accom-
plished by case law. Rather, the wording of earlier statutes banning power-of-sale 
foreclosure permitted certain legislatures to introduce a new real estate finance 
instrument, the deed of trust, to permit power-of-sale foreclosure. In particular, 
Oregon (1961), Utah (1961), Arizona (1971), and New Mexico (2006) passed 
deed-of-trust statutes to circumvent the previous statutes in these states, which 
applied only to mortgages.
3.3. Statutory Redemption Periods
As foreclosure by sale became the normal procedure to foreclose—both in sit-
uations in which the mortgage contained a power-of-sale clause and in judicial 
foreclosure—legislatures interceded to protect borrowers by enacting statutory 
redemption periods. There are more changes to redemption rights over time 
than to the availability of power-of-sale foreclosure because, unlike power-of-sale 
clauses, redemption periods are set by statute rather than settled primarily in case 
law. Table 5 summarizes the changes in the rights of redemption over time.The 
average number of changes is .88 and the median number of changes is 1.6 
Although more flexible than power-of-sale foreclosure, highlighting the im-
portance of early institutional developments, redemption periods are surpris-
ingly persistent. More than half of all states did not change their policy on re-
demption periods substantially between the first available date for which I have 
data, typically before the Civil War, and 1938. Since 1938 there have been more 
6 Baker, Miceli, and Sirmans (2008) also summarize the rights of redemption afforded to the bor-
rower in the various states and some of the changes over time.
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changes, with the tendency being toward reducing the redemption period. Be-
tween 1957 and 2008, a total of 23 states reduced or eliminated their redemp-
tion periods by statute. Only Connecticut increased the redemption period by 
inserting a 3-month period for equitable right of redemption. It seems that in-
stitutional inertia rather than any other factor has led many states to retain their 
rights of redemption from the 19th century.
Unlike the pattern in nonjudicial foreclosure, there is more geographical clus-
tering of redemption rights, as Figure 3 shows. I chose 1904 as the date to illus-
trate rather than 1879, the earliest date with available data, to allow the effect of 
the mortgage distress of the 1890s to be reflected. The greater influence of ge-
ography in redemption rights owes to legislatures responding more than judges 
to regionalized mortgage distress. While not a perfect mapping, western states—
which were more reliant on out-of-state credit and had more farm mortgage dis-
tress—tended to have more generous redemption periods than did states in the 
Northeast.
Some states allowed the borrower 2 years or more, while others afforded the 
borrower no grace period. The borrower usually retained possession of the prop-
erty until the expiry of the redemption rights (see Russell and Bridewell 1938). In 
some cases, attempts by states to provide for a redemption period were deemed 
unconstitutional by the courts, such as the attempt by Missouri to allow borrow-
ers a 30-month redemption period (Skilton 1943).
To summarize, the validity of power-of-sale clauses was usually initially de-
termined in case law, and judges usually deemed contracts with them legitimate. 
Absent an intervention by the legislature, the case law on power-of-sale foreclo-
sure almost never changed over time despite evolving economic circumstances. 
Rather, changes in the validity of power-of-sale clauses were accomplished by 
statute and usually undermined creditors’ rights in response to populist pres-
sures. In contrast, redemption rights, which are determined by statute in a pro-
cess similar to that in civil countries, change more frequently and reflect more 
populist influences.
4. The Great Depression: Antideficiency Statutes and  
Statutory Moratoria
The farm and home mortgage distress of the Great Depression presented a 
unique challenge for state legislators and judges. Legislatures almost universally 
intervened in a way aimed to benefit current mortgagors and, to the extent the re-
strictions led lenders to restrict the supply of credit (see Pence 2006), future mort-
gagors. I have already noted the interventions of New Mexico and North Dakota 
to ban nonjudicial foreclosure during the 1930s. Poteat (1938) documents that 
31 other state legislatures intervened on behalf of debtors in the 1930s. Much of 
the statutory relief was meant to abrogate private contracts to which both parties 
had agreed. The statutes mostly consisted of restrictions on deficiency judgments, 
foreclosure moratoria, or both. As I will show, judges tempered legislators’ zeal 
for relieving debtors of their burdens at the expense of creditors.
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4.1. Antideficiency Statutes
Until the Great Depression, there were few restrictions on deficiency judg-
ments. As of 1879, in most states and territories the lender was free to pursue “all 
his remedies concurrently or successively” (Jones 1879, p. 2:233). By that time, it 
had become standard for an American mortgage to consist of both a note and the 
mortgage itself, and the lender could both sue on the note and seize the property 
(Jones 1879, vol. 2, chap. 27), often simultaneously. Only in California and Col-
orado did the lender have only one remedy (Jones 1879, vol. 2, chap. 30), what is 
now known as the one-action rule, and only in California could the lender take 
an action precluding it from the right to a deficiency judgment. In Minnesota and 
Nevada the borrower had to exhaust the property before suing on the note (Jones 
1879, vol. 2, chap. 27), which is somewhat similar in effect to the one-action rule. 
In Dakota Territory, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, and Wash-
ington Territory, the lender could not simultaneously sue on the promissory note 
and file a lawsuit for foreclosure; the lender could pursue actions in the sequence 
of its choice, however.
The more moderate antideficiency statutes of the 1930s consisted of fair- 
market-value provisions. A fair-market-value provision is a requirement that, 
regardless of the value of the winning bid at the foreclosure sale, the borrower 
receives credit for the fair market value of the property in determining the size of 
the deficiency judgment. Although some states’ codes had fair-market-value re-
strictions prior to the 1930s (see Skilton 1942), during 1933–35, Alabama, Idaho, 
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas all 
modified their statutes to include a fair-market-value provision (Poteat 1938). 
Without a fair-market-value provision, creditors can abuse deficiency judgments 
as, unlike their British counterparts, American lenders could bid at a sale in lieu 
of foreclosure. Often, they were the only bidders and bid far less than the value of 
the debt or the fair market value of the property, which left borrowers liable for 
the deficiency. Since foreclosure by sale had become the standard procedure, with 
the lender often the only bidder, this left the borrower exposed to the risk that he 
would both lose his property and owe a substantial deficiency judgment in excess 
of his true debt if the lender bid less than the debt. Skilton (1942) and Vaughan 
(1940) detail several such cases of lenders bidding amounts far lower than the fair 
market value of property.
Consistent with preventing such abuses, judges in the 1930s deemed many of 
the antideficiency statutes with fair-market-value restrictions constitutional pro-
vided that the statute was limited to a fair-market-value restriction and did not 
otherwise infringe on the enforcement of the mortgage contract. Judges declared 
the fair-market-value restrictions in the statutes of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, and Texas to be unconstitutional as impairments of the contracts 
clause of the U.S. Constitution. In the case of New Jersey, this was likely because 
the act also included several other procedural requirements on deficiency judg-
ments such that courts determined that the law would have been a de facto viola-
tion of the contracts clause. Similarly, the Pennsylvania statute contained a num-
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ber of procedural restrictions on the foreclosure process. The Supreme Court of 
South Carolina judge determined in Federal Land Bank v. Garrison (185 S.C. 255, 
193 S.E. 308 [1937]) that, because the act included a fair-market-value provision 
written in such a way as to apply retroactively, the entire act was unconstitutional 
and thus null and void. The Texas law may have been declared unconstitutional 
because of the vague language of the law; the law required the borrower to get 
credit for the “actual value” of the property.
Many states went much further in restricting the rights of lenders in deficiency 
judgments during the Great Depression. The appendix in Poteat (1938) provides 
a state-by-state account of the antideficiency statutes and the case law surround-
ing them as of 1938. The legislatures of Iowa and Ohio set a statute of limitations 
of 2 years on when the creditor could collect on the deficiency judgment. Michi-
gan passed a statute mandating that the lender use judicial foreclosure if it wished 
to secure a deficiency judgment. Georgia enacted a statute requiring that the de-
ficiency judgment be filed within 30 days of the foreclosure sale if the lender had 
used a power-of-sale clause to foreclose. A number of  states (Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota) attempted to prohibit deficiency judgments entirely during the 
1933–35 period, often only for purchase mortgages.
The case of Arkansas provides an insightful illustration of why some states’ at-
tempts to ban deficiency judgments were successful and others were not. In Ar-
kansas, as in other states, the statute was intended to apply to current mortgages. 
The court in Arkansas, as in most other states, struck down the constitutionality 
of any restriction on the lender’s right to a deficiency judgment on mortgages 
entered into before the legislature passed the statute, as that would violate the 
contracts clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, in most states judges upheld 
the constitutionality of the law as it applied to future mortgages. In Adams v. 
Spillyards (187 Ark. 641, 61 S.W.2d 686, 649–50 [1933]), however, Judge Edgar L. 
McHaney of the Supreme Court of Arkansas prevented the act from any perma-
nent effects by writing,
Now, as to its application to future contracts, or to mortgages and deeds of trust on real 
estate executed subsequent to the effective date of the act, we think a careful examination 
of the act itself discloses that it has no application to the foreclosure of such contracts or 
mortgages. It does not in express terms apply to foreclosures on mortgages and deeds of 
trust on real estate to be hereafter executed, but apparently to foreclosures on contracts 
already in existence. In fact, the words “mortgage” or “deed of trust” are nowhere used 
in the act. Foreclosures on real estate are several times mentioned, and foreclosures on 
mechanics’ liens and purchase money liens are covered as well as mortgages and deeds 
of trust. The evident purpose of the Legislature was to relieve a present condition by ap-
plying the poultice of the act to the sore spot of deficiency judgments in foreclosures of 
mortgages, caused by decline in realty values. They made it expressly applicable to cases 
of foreclosure now pending and sales already made but not confirmed, which could not 
possibly have reference to future contracts, (section 3); and also to “suits filed after the 
effective date of this act and real property is sold under foreclosure decree of courts fore-
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closing same, said sale shall not be confirmed,” etc. The whole context, we think, shows 
the Legislature was dealing with what it deemed a temporary emergency.
Thus, a seemingly minor difference in wording between the antideficiency stat-
ute of Arkansas and those of states like Arizona and California led to permanent 
differences in foreclosure law and outcomes. The Arizona, California, Minnesota, 
Montana, North Carolina, and North Dakota prohibitions continue to this day.
Comparing the restrictions above with those Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) report 
for 2009, we can see that virtually all of the restrictions on deficiency judgments 
other than some states’ fair-market-value provisions date from the foreclosure 
crisis of the early 1930s. To better understand why states differed in whether they 
tried to enact a ban on deficiency judgments, I look at foreclosure rates from the 
1931–32 period using data from farm mortgages and the importance of out-of-
state farm mortgage credit in 1930. The data for farm foreclosure rates are from 
Stauber and Reagan (1935) and include foreclosures because of tax liens. Deeds 
in lieu are counted as foreclosures. See Alston (1983, 1984) for more discussion of 
farm foreclosures in the Great Depression.
To proxy for the relative importance of out-of-state capital, I compute the 1930 
ratio of total farm mortgages in the state to real estate mortgages made by banks 
in that state. A high ratio indicates that the state is more dependent on out-of-
state capital. The hypothesis is that legislators are more responsive to their own 
electorate than to individuals who live in another state and are unable to exact 
vengeance on pro-debtor legislators at the voting booth. The data on the volume 
of farm mortgages are from Horton, Larsen, and Wall (1942), and the banking 
data are from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1959).7
I estimate a probit model in which the dependent variable takes a value of one 
if the state attempted to prohibit deficiency judgments and zero otherwise. I view 
the decisions by courts regarding the constitutionality of the prohibition to be 
primarily idiosyncratic results of different judges rather than the concerted ef-
forts of state legislators. As a result, even if the attempt to prohibit deficiency 
judgments failed, I code the dependent variable as one. I estimate the model us-
ing the combined foreclosure rate for 1931 and 1932, although the results are 
very similar when I use the combined foreclosure rate for 1931–33 or the com-
bined foreclosure rate for 1931–34.
The first column of Table 6 contains the results of the benchmark probit esti-
mates. The table shows the effect of a 1-unit change on the probability that the 
state attempted to ban deficiency judgments estimated at the means of foreclo-
sure rates. An increase of 10 foreclosures per 1,000 farms per year is associated 
with a 6-percentage-point higher chance of attempting to enact a ban on defi-
ciency judgments, and the coefficient on the farm foreclosure rate is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level in every specification. The share of loans pro-
7 The ideal Out-of-State Credit variable would use as the denominator the total amount of farm 
real estate mortgages made by banks in that state rather than the total amount of real estate mort-
gages made by banks in that state. Unfortunately, the banking data do not disaggregate mortgages 
made by banks in a state into residential, farm, and other until 1939.
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vided by out-of-state creditors also influenced whether the state attempted to ban 
deficiency judgments. The coefficient on Out-of-State Credit is statistically sig-
nificant at only the 10 percent level for one specification. The reason for the weak 
statistical significance of Out-of-State Credit is likely because the two variables 
are highly correlated. As Table 7 illustrates, the correlation between the proxy for 
out-of-state credit and the foreclosure rate is 44 percent.
One concern with Out-of-State Credit is that it may be partially capturing the 
importance of agriculture to the state rather than merely the extent to which the 
state depends on out-of-state capital. To my knowledge, there is no reason to be-
lieve that a more agrarian state would be more likely to follow populist policies. 
However, Table 7 shows that the correlation between Out-of-State Credit and the 
share of the state’s population that was rural according to the 1930 U.S. census 
Table 6
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation  
on Deficiency Judgment Bans
(1) (2)
Farmfrate3132 .0058** .0074**
(.0018) (.0025)
Out-of-State Credit .0082+ .0099*
(.0047) (.0049)
Rural Share −.0035
(.0034)
Pseudo R2 (%) 34 37
Note. The dependent variable takes a value of one if the state legislature 
attempted a ban on deficiency judgments in 1933–35. The term 
Farmfrate3132 is the average number of foreclosures per 1,000 farms in 
1931 and 1932 combined; Out-of-State Credit is the 1930 ratio of farm 
mortgages in the state to total real estate loans by banks in the state; 
Rural Share is the percentage of the state’s population that lived in rural 
areas according to the 1930 census. Both specifications correctly predict 
87.2% of outcomes. N = 47.
 + Significant at the 10% level.
 * Significant at the 5% level.
 ** Significant at the 1% level.
Table 7
Correlation between Independent Variables Predicting Attempted Antideficiency
Farmfrate3132 Out-of-State Credit Rural Share
Farmfrate3132 100
Out-of-State Credit 44 100
Rural Share 66 48 100
Note. The term Farmfrate3132 is the average number of foreclosures per 1,000 farms in 1931 and 1932 
combined; Out-of-State Credit is the 1930 ratio of farm mortgages in the state to total real estate loans by 
banks in the state; Rural Share is the percentage of the state’s population that lived in rural areas according 
to the 1930 census.
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is 48 percent. To address the possibility that Out-of-State Credit is proxying for 
how agrarian the state is, another probit model includes the share of the popula-
tion that was rural to better capture the extent to which creditors were nonvoters. 
The results are very similar to the benchmark specification, and the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant.
Table 8 breaks down the accuracy of the predictions by outcome. The probit 
model correctly predicts 87 percent of outcomes. Table 8 shows that the model 
correctly predicts 81 percent of the 83 percent of states that did not attempt a 
ban. The model is less successful in predicting the rarer outcome of a state at-
tempting a ban: it predicts slightly less than one-half of the 17 percent of states 
that attempted a ban. The χ2-statistic for a test of independence between the out-
comes predicted by the model and the actual outcomes observed is [(3−.68)2/.68] 
+ [(1−3.32)2/3.32] + [(5−7.32)2/7.32] + [(38−35.68)2/35.68] = 10.4, which is statis-
tically significant at the 1 percent level.
4.2. Foreclosure Moratoria
During the Great Depression, the majority of state legislatures also enacted 
foreclosure moratoria. The moratoria varied in character and included a tempo-
rary increase in the statutory redemption period, a stay on all foreclosures until 
a specific date (for example, 1935), a stay on all foreclosures for an unspecified 
period of time (for example, “until the emergency has passed”), and a grant of 
more discretion to judges in deciding whether a foreclosure suit could proceed. 
In many cases the moratoria were voluntary (Skilton 1943). Alston (1984) shows 
that states with higher farm foreclosure rates were more likely to enact such mor-
atoria, while Rucker and Alston (1987) demonstrate that these moratoria suc-
cessfully prevented farm foreclosures. However, Alston (1984) also shows that 
creditors reacted by providing less new mortgage credit. These findings are con-
sistent with the assertion in this paper that statutory law reacts to populist senti-
ment to the disadvantage of creditors.
What is perhaps less appreciated is how state judiciaries reacted to such mor-
atoria. Bunn (1933), D.P.K. (1933), Poteat (1938), and Skilton (1943) review the 
case law extensively. Judiciaries declared many of the compulsory moratoria, and 
all those without clearly defined end dates were deemed unconstitutional because 
they violated the contracts clause. The courts of Idaho declared even a foreclosure 
holiday statute an unconstitutional impairment of contract (Poteat 1938). The 
Table 8
 Probit Model Predictions of Attempted Deficiency Ban versus Outcomes
Actual
Predicted Attempted Ban
Did Not  
Attempt Ban Total
Attempted ban 3 1 4
Did not attempt ban 5 38 43
 Total 8 39 47
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Supreme Court of North Dakota decreed that any extension of the statutory re-
demption period to mortgages existing before the moratorium statute had passed 
was unconstitutional (D.P.K. 1933). The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas struck 
down a similar statute (D.P.K. 1933). The Texas legislature tried again in 1934 
to provide some relief to mortgagors by authorizing judges of the district courts 
to stay foreclosure suits and grant continuances, but the courts of Texas deemed 
this statute to also be unconstitutional (Poteat 1938). In 1938 the Nebraska Su-
preme Court declared a similar statute enacted by the legislature in 1937 uncon-
stitutional (Poteat 1938). Even when judiciaries did not strike down a morato-
rium, they limited its scope or made clear in a ruling that they would not tolerate 
extensions of it.
Iowa is perhaps the only case in which a judge instituted a moratorium: Judge 
Charles C. Bradley agreed not to sign any more foreclosures as a condition of his 
release after being kidnapped and beaten by several Iowa farmers (Skilton 1943). 
Despite such threats to their own safety, justices in Iowa limited the scope of the 
legislature’s moratorium statute (Poteat 1938). Judges in Minnesota and Wiscon-
sin also faced angry mobs at the courthouses (see, for example, New York Times 
1933a, 1933b). It is in this climate that judges in Minnesota and Wisconsin de-
clared these states’ moratoria statutes, both of which had a limited time frame, 
constitutional.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, I have reviewed the history of America’s mortgage laws. Aspects 
of mortgage law that develop in case law rarely change, while features of mort-
gage law determined by statute show more variation over time. Furthermore, to 
the extent that legislatures intervene in mortgage law, they do so in populist fash-
ion. In contrast, judges limit the application of statutes abrogating creditor rights. 
Thus, while the history of mortgage law reveals fundamental differences between 
how laws are determined in case law and in civil code, it does not support the hy-
pothesis that case law is inherently more flexible.
Appendix
Title versus Lien Theory
As of 1878, the description of state mortgage laws by Jones (1878) permits the 
theory underlying mortgage laws in the United States (some of which were then 
territories) to be loosely classified according to Table A1.8 Such classifications 
are not absolute; for example, many title-theory statutes explicitly state that the 
lender is not the owner of the property despite having title for the duration of 
the mortgage. For comparison, Table A1 also presents the legal theory underly-
ing mortgages in each state in 1957 from Prather (1957) and in 1995 from Geis 
(1995). Despite more than a century having passed, most states that followed title 
8 Jones (1878) uses the classification “mortgage of common law” versus “mortgage of equity.”
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theory in 1878 retained some vestige of it in 1995. Of the 21 states that followed 
title theory in 1878, only Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, and West Virginia were 
considered lien-theory states by 1995. The comparison shows how persistent le-
gal foundations can be in a legal system based on case law such as the American 
system.
Table A1
Dominant Legal Theory of Mortgages in U.S. States
State by Region 1879   1957   1995
Pacific:
 Alaska N.D. N.D. Lien
 California Lien Lien Lien
 Hawaii N.D. Lien Lien
 Oregon Lien Lien Lien
 Washington N.D. Lien Lien
Mountain:
 Arizona Lien Lien Lien
 Colorado Lien Lien Lien
 Idaho N.D. Lien Lien
 Montana N.D. Lien Lien
 Nevada Lien Lien Lien
 New Mexico N.D. Lien Lien
 Utah Lien Lien Lien
 Wyoming N.D. Lien Lien
West North Central:
 Iowa Lien Lien Lien
 Kansas Lien Lien Lien
 Minnesota Title Lien Lien
 Missouri Lien Intermediate Lien
 Nebraska Lien Lien Lien
 North Dakota N.D. Lien Lien
 South Dakota N.D. Lien Lien
West South Central:
 Arkansas Title Intermediate Lien
 Louisiana Lien Lien Lien
 Oklahoma N.D. Lien Lien
 Texas Lien Lien Lien
East North Central:
 Illinois Title Intermediate Intermediate
 Indiana Lien Lien Lien
 Missouri Lien Lien Lien
 Ohio Title Intermediate Intermediate
 Wisconsin Lien Lien Lien
East South Central:
 Alabama Title Title Title
 Kentucky Title Lien Lien
 Mississippi Title Intermediate Intermediate
 Tennessee Title Title Title
Middle Atlantic:
 New Jersey Title Intermediate Intermediate
 New York Lien Lien Lien
 Pennsylvania Title Title Intermediate
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Figure A1 shows that the states that followed title theory in 1879 were predom-
inantly older states. Of the original 13 colonies, only New York, Georgia, and the 
Carolinas followed lien theory while, of the states incorporated after 1840, only 
Florida, Minnesota, and West Virginia followed title theory. The only states west 
of the Mississippi to follow title theory were Arkansas and Minnesota. The reason 
is that older states modeled their mortgage laws on British laws. In 1878, the Brit-
ish Empire continued to follow the title theory of mortgages, and Jones (1878) 
attributes the lien theory of mortgages to the 18th-century English barrister Lord 
Mansfield. New York led the way; as early as 1828, it was a lien-theory state. As 
a young state, California tried to emulate New York in its civil code (see, for ex-
ample, Guidotti 1943), which explains why it chose lien theory at an early date. 
Many still younger western states chose to follow California law, and so there is a 
much greater likelihood of following lien theory among the western states.
Table A1 (Continued)
State by Region 1879 1957 1995
South Atlantic:
 Delaware Lien Intermediate Lien
 District of Columbia N.D. Intermediate N.D.
 Florida Title Lien Lien
 Georgia Lien Title Lien
 Maryland Title Title Intermediate
 North Carolina Title Intermediate Intermediate
 South Carolina Lien Lien Lien
 Virginia Title Intermediate Title
 West Virginia Title Intermediate Lien
New England:
 Connecticut Title Intermediate Title
 Maine Title Title Title
 Maryland Title Intermediate Intermediate
 New Hampshire Title Title Title
 Rhode Island Title Title Title
 Vermont Title Intermediate Intermediate
Sources. Jones (1878); Prather (1957); Geis (1995).
Note. N.D. = no data.
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